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Abstract
Collective action clauses (CACs) are provisions specifying that a supermajority of bondholders
can change the terms of a bond. We study how CACs determine governments’ fiscal incentives,
sovereign bond prices, and default probabilities in environments with and without contingent debt
and IMF presence. We claim that CACs are likely to be an irrelevant dimension of debt contracts in
current sovereign debt markets because of the variety of instruments utilized by sovereigns and the
implicit IMF guarantee. Nonetheless, under a new international bankruptcy regime like that recently
proposed by the IMF, CACs can increase significantly the cost of borrowing for sovereigns, contrary
to what is suggested in previous empirical literature.
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1. Introduction
Collective action clauses (CACs) are provisions in debt contracts specifying that the
terms of the contract regarding principal, interest, and maturity can change if there is
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CACs determine governments’ fiscal incentives, bond yields, and default probabilities.
Understanding these interactions is essential for the design of the so-called bSovereign
Debt Restructuring MechanismQ (SDRM) proposed by the IMF and currently under
discussion.
1
CACs introduce flexibility in situations of financial distress by facilitating renegotia-
tion.
2 In their absence, bondholders have no incentives to enter into the renegotiation
process since, individually, they are unable to affect the probability of repayment (as long
as the debt is not held by a large lender). CACs solve the problem of free riding among
creditors within a legal jurisdiction because a supermajority of bondholders can make
the outcome of the renegotiation mandatory for all. But the existence of CACs does
not always imply a friendly restructuring process. Sovereigns tend to issue debt in
different jurisdictions, and while CACs coordinate creditors within each one, the free
riding problem between jurisdictions remains. This is a feature of the 1990s not
present in the 1980s, when few banks concentrated most of the sovereign bonds. To
attend to this problem, the idea of an international bankruptcy procedure (or an
SDRM), to coordinate creditors in different jurisdictions, has been put forward.
3
It has been argued that facilitating renegotiation can have both positive and negative
consequences. Because renegotiation relieves countries from debt overhang, governments
might run reckless fiscal policies that increase the likelihood of financial crisis. Since
lenders anticipate this behavior, the cost of the lack of commitment to run responsible
fiscal policies is borne by the country itself. In the end, the severity of the moral hazard
problem determines whether facilitating renegotiation, by creating an SDRM, make
countries worse or better off. The debate about the value of an SDRM lies precisely on this
trade off.
4
We setup up a model to understand the determinants of this tension. We focus on
environments where countries can strategically issue debt with and without CACs, and
in different legal jurisdictions, both in the presence and absence of the IMF. We show
that an SDRM is never a good idea when debt contracts are state contingent. Under
uncontingent debt payments, we derive a series of implications that we believe are both
new and relevant for the discussion of an international bankruptcy procedure.
Furthermore, we point at some empirical evidence to question conclusions from
previous empirical results.
1 The discussion about policies regarding sovereign debt dates back at least to Adam Smith. See the evolution
of these ideas in Rogoff and Zettelmeyer (2002).
2 See Dixon and Wall (2000) and Sturzenegger (2002) for descriptions of commonly used CACs.
3 Ghosal and Miller (2003) evaluate CACs against a SDRM with an international bankruptcy court. They favor
the latter given that this court is assumed to have verifiability, commitment, and enforceability power (all of which
are assumed away in our discussion). Eaton (2002) also assumes that an international bankruptcy court can
distinguish why things went bad (verifiability).
4 This trade off is in the spirit of Bolton and Scharfstein (1996). See Morris and Shin (2003) and Corsetti et al.
(2003) for an interesting catalytic finance approach alternative to our (ex post) incentive imperfection. See
Haldane et al. (2003) for an asymmetric informational approach and Jeanne (2003) for a model where debt
maturity works as a commitment device.
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in affecting the trade off between ex post restructuring cost and ex ante moral hazard.
Recent work by Eichengreen and Mody (2000) shows that yields on primary
sovereign debt markets (initial auctions) are higher when bonds have CACs,
especially for low rated borrowers.
5 Becker et al. (2003) and Gugiatti and Richards
(2003) argue that bond prices are not affected very much by the implicit (legal jurisdiction)
or explicit inclusion of these types of clauses when looking at yields in secondary markets.
Hence, they conjecture that either financial markets are not really aware of the role of those
clauses, or the moral hazard problem that these clauses bring to international credit
markets does not outweigh the ex post inefficiencies of no renegotiation. Therefore,
switching to an SDRM would not increase the yields paid by sovereigns.
6
We argue that these empirical exercises suffer from the Lucas’ critique. The reason
is that bond yields are estimated under the current regime, characterized by no
renegotiation due to a bcompositional effectQ and the presence of the IMF. This
compositional effect, which is missing in the literature, comes from the free riding
problem among creditors of different jurisdictions. We claim that these clauses are
likely to be irrelevant in sovereign debt markets, and hence, spreads of yields of
bonds with and without CACs are uninformative about moral hazard problems.
Nonetheless, our framework suggests that these yields and the moral hazard problem
could worsen in a regime with an SDRM and CACs (under full coordination among
creditors).
Quantitatively, these compositional effects are relevant. By 2002, 59% off all
international borrowing occurred under US jurisdiction, 10% under German
jurisdiction, and 6% under Japanese law, all with no collective action provisions,
while 24% resided in the UK, where the opposite is true.
7 It is then reasonable to
expect no major difference between yields of bonds with and without CACs. Once the
country is financially distress, holders of bonds with friendly restructuring provisions
might not forgive because they posses a minority of the total outstanding debt, and they
can only marginally affect the probability of repayment. In particular, we show the
compositional effect was present in the case of Argentina 2001. Furthermore, we show that
yields of bonds with and without CACs where not only similar before but also during the
crisis. This is evidence against the argument that the ex ante moral hazard problem is
balanced by the ex post gains from renegotiation. Instead, this evidence favors our story
claiming that compositional effects make CACs irrelevant, explaining why the sovereign
debt markets do not really care about these clauses. We also show that compositional
effects are likely to have been present in other cases of default.
We also show that the presence of the IMF affects the international allocation of
capital and hence default probabilities and yields. Furthermore, it can also affect the
decision of governments to include CACs in bonds or not. When the IMF has a
5 Eichengreen et al. (2003) confirm these findings utilizing data on secondary debt markets.
6 Similar arguments are presented in Haldane et al. (2003) and Dixon and Wall (2000).
7 See Geithner et al. (2002) for the composition of international borrowing. See Gianviti (2002) for differences
in main national laws (English, US, German, and Japanese laws).
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avoid a financial crisis. This implies that lenders would always get paid, either by the
country or by the IMF, and hence, yields would never reflect default probabilities. In
this case, yields are uninformative with respect to moral hazard (which is maximized
under full bailout). For that reason, we should carefully understand the interactions of
governments, lenders, and the IMF in sovereign debt markets before drawing
conclusions about an SDRM.
The theory suggests that sometimes there will be conflict between governments
and the IMF regarding the creation of an SDRM. Given that the IMF will
intervene, governments sometimes prefer not to have an SDRM to then enjoy the
subsidy of the implicit IMF guaranty. But the IMF would prefer to have an SDRM
in place so that lenders internalize the costs of lending to reckless governments. The
theory also suggests that conflict does not necessarily exist between lenders and the
IMF. When moral hazard issues are important, countries and the IMF would prefer
not to have an SDRM to induce fiscal responsibility as a commitment device not to
renegotiate.
Lastly, most of the literature works under the assumption that an SDRM always
induces some moral hazard. On the contrary, our framework illustrates the possibility
that an SDRM could actually induce better incentives. To see this point, first suppose
that the IMF would prefer not to intervene if lenders were to renegotiate under an
SDRM but would prefer to launch a bailout in the absence of an SDRM. If the
moral hazard problem is important, countries might prefer to be punished by the
outcome of the renegotiation with lenders than by having a generous IMF bailout. In
other words, countries would be better off under an SDRM precisely because it can
provide greater incentives for governments to avoid financial crises.
The rest of the paper is divided in three sections. In Section 2, we present the model and
analyze different contractual environments without the IMF. In Section 3, we introduce the
IMF and derive its implications for sovereign debt markets. Finally, in Section 4,w e
explain the implications of our theory regarding sovereign yields and discuss previous
literature.
2. The model
We describe the model with the help of Fig. 1. This is a two-period world. The
world begins with a country issuing an amount D of debt in period one. The
resources raised are allocated into two types of government expenditures: bproductiveQ
(G1)a n dbunproductiveQ (G2).
8 Unproductive government expenditure gives the
country’s government a total utility of kG2, with kN0. The interest rate is zero, without
loss of generality. In the second period, the first source of uncertainty is realized. It is
known whether the country enters a situation where it needs a financial restructuring, or if
it simply does well. When the country performs well, the government obtains a fiscal
8 This resembles the investment–consumption decision in Atkeson (1991).
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becomes Yh Dh+kG2, which occurs with probability h(G1). We assume that
hVz0;lim
G1Y0 hV G1 ðÞ ¼ l;hV D ðÞ ¼ 0 and hVVb0. Thus, the role of the productive govern-
ment expenditure is to increase the probability of the country avoiding the conflict with
bondholders and producing a high level of output.
With probability 1 h(G1), the country falls into a state of financial distress, in
which case, the chances of meeting debt obligations are at risk. At this stage, the
government decides how much fiscal effort e to exert. Higher fiscal effort increases
the probability of reaching the intermediate state of the world, where the government
gets a monetary payoff Yl. We assume that YhNYlN0. The fiscal effort is assumed to
be increasingly costly to capture the idea that raising additional resources when the
country is financially distressed is increasingly expensive. This is a nonmonetary cost
such as the political cost of raising taxes. In particular, we assume that the fiscal
effort cost function is g(e)w i t hgVN0, gWN0, and e a [0, 1]. Also, this cost is paid
in advance before the realization of the uncertainty. Thus, the government’s payoff at
the second stage is Yl Dl g(e)+kG2, assumed to occur with probability e. With
probability 1 e, the government is unable to generate a surplus and hence repay any
debt. Then, the government’s payoff simply becomes kG2 g(e).
The three states of the world are observable for the parties. Debt payments in these
states are Dh, Dl, and zero. Further notation regarding debt contracts is introduced later to
deal with the composition of sovereign debt. Finally, our economy is supposed to face a
mass of infinitesimal risk neutral competitive lenders.
For simplicity, we also assume:
Assumption 1. g(e)=((1)/(1+v))e
1+vYl, with vN0.
Where Yl is used for normalization purposes. Now, we concentrate on solving
allocations under different contractual environments.
Fig. 1. The game.
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As a benchmark, we setup the allocation problem of an economy that faces complete
contracts (those that can be written in terms of all relevant variables). Allocations in this
economy come from solving the first best problem
max
Dh;Dl;Gl;G2;e








h G1 ðÞ Dh þ 1   h G1 ðÞ ½  eDlzD ð2Þ
G1 þ G2 ¼ D ð3Þ
With probability h, the government reaches the high state, while with probability 1 h,
it gets to the distressed state. Then, the government exerts fiscal effort (at a cost g(e)) and
obtains a payoff Yl Dl with probability e. The objective function is maximized subject to
two constraints. Eq. (2) is the lenders’ participation constraint. Lenders’ expected profits
should be at least zero. Eq. (3) is the government’s resource constraint.
Note that our allocations solve for all decision variables simultaneously, while, in the
game, decisions are made sequentially (first, resources are borrowed, then government
expenditure is decided, finally fiscal effort is exerted if needed). While allocations
maximize the ex ante utility, they are not optimal ex post (once the country has borrowed).
Nonetheless, the first best problem solves for allocations implicitly assuming that the
government is committed (or contractually obligated) to choose the level of productive
government expenditure G1 and the fiscal effort under financial distress e. We now relax
the assumption of complete contracts to study the implications for allocations and welfare.
Assumption 2. G1, G2, and e are unobservable to lenders.
For future reference, we say that a debt contract dominates another one when it derives
higher or equal government utility on the parameter set while it derives strictly greater
utility for some nonempty parameter subset.
2.2. State contingent debt payments and no CACs
Because of Assumption 2, financial contracts cannot be written on G1, G2,o re.A sw e
know, these variables affect the probability of debt repayment. This imperfection
introduces a moral hazard problem when G1 and G2 are chosen in the first period and
when the fiscal effort e is decided in the second period. Allocations in this economy come
from maximizing the expected utility of the government subject to Constrains (2), (3) and
Yl   Dl ðÞ ¼ evYl ð4Þ
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(under financial distress). At that point, the debt contract is irreversible and all variables
except the level of fiscal effort are given. Ex post, the fiscal effort exerted will be that
coming from this expression. Because of Assumption 2, no other fiscal effort level can be
contracted (or committed to), and hence, allocations must satisfy this constraint since no
other allocation is an equilibrium. Note that this constraint holds with equality because Dl
will never exceed Yl since these are all the government’s resources at this stage. Eq. (5) is
the incentive compatibility constraint for the government in the first period when it
chooses to allocate its resources between productive and unproductive uses. Again, the
incentive compatibility constraint is imposed because the government cannot commit in
advance to a prespecified government expenditure plan.
From Eq. (4), we get that fiscal effort is
e ¼
Yl   Dl
Yl
   1=v
ð6Þ
where effort e a [0, 1]. The chances of the government being able to pay back at least part
of the debt are driven by Dl itself. In the case of no debt, the fiscal effort exerted is e=1 and
the country never reaches the no-output state. A huge debt overhang goes against the fiscal
incentives to meet debt payments as effort decreases with Dl. This point turns out to be
important in our story. In particular, if Yl=Dl, e=0.




EU ¼ h G1 ðÞ Yh   Dh ½  þ 1   h G1 ðÞ ½ 
v Yl   Dl ðÞ
1þv
v
1 þ v ðÞ Y
1=v
l
þ kD   G1 ðÞ ð 7Þ
subject to
h G1 ðÞ Dh þ 1   h G1 ðÞ ½ 






hV G1 ðÞ Yh   Dh  
v Yl   Dl ðÞ
1þv
v





A closed form solution for this problem does not exist.
Problem I implicitly assumes that the debt contract cannot be renegotiated because of
the free riding problem between creditors. This is assumed to be the case when bonds do
not include CACs (unanimous consent is required). When debt contracts do include CACs,
bondholders can potentially reach a restructuring agreement that would benefit both sides,
creditors, and the debtor country.
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To see how this works, imagine that the government has reached a state of conflict with
lenders before effort is exerted. For generality, also assume that, at this stage, part of the
debt is symmetrically distributed in n legal jurisdictions that implicitly or explicitly include
collective action provisions in bonds, while the rest of this debt is issued with no special
provisions. Jurisdictions can enforce the outcome of the renegotiation process to all
bondholders in their own countries, but they are unable to do so in other jurisdictions.
Furthermore, assume all jurisdictions renegotiate at the same time. Do lenders have
incentive to renegotiate in this case? The answer depends on the composition of the debt.
Lenders might be better off by relieving part of the debt overhang to this country and thus
inducing the government to increase its probability of repayment when a large enough
mass of bonds is renegotiated.
When renegotiation is allowed, the debt after renegotiation would be the one that
maximizes the value of the debt for each jurisdiction, given the actions of the rest of the
jurisdictions. Lenders within jurisdiction i are assumed to behave as one big lender who







Yl   DC
li   DC
l i   DNC





C denotes the payment to jurisdiction i after renegotiation, Dl i
C is the payment to
the rest of the jurisdictions with collective action provisions, Dl
NC is the payment to
bondholders without friendly restructuring clauses, and Dl
C is the total payments promised
to all jurisdictions that include CACs. Eqs. (11) and (12) are the government’s incentive
compatibility constraint and participation constraint, respectively. Our solution follows



















Yl   DNC
l
1 þ nv ðÞ Yl
   1=v
ð15Þ
As long as an interior solution exists (Eq. (12) is not binding), there will be
renegotiation. Notice that the total amount of renegotiated debt by jurisdiction decreases
with the number of jurisdictions and the amount of debt issued without collective action
provisions. This implies that as the free riding problem worsens, each jurisdiction will tend
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increases in n and Dl
NC. Also, with Eq. (15), they show that total forgiveness and effort
decrease with the number of jurisdictions and the amount of debt issued without CACs.
Hence, the conditional probability of default, given that the country is in financial distress
(e), increases with these two compositional effects.








v Yl   DC
l   DNC
l
   ð16Þ
This expression shows that compositional effects in sovereign debt are important as a
commitment device to not renegotiate. Renegotiation is less likely to occur as the
composition of debt without CACs increases (Dl
C falls) and as the number of jurisdictions
increases. This issue, missing in the literature, turn out to be key in the discussion about
the implications of an international bankruptcy procedure on sovereign yields (postponed
to the last section).
An SDRM would coordinate bondholders of different jurisdictions since all bonds
issued by the same country would fall under this umbrella in case of financial distress. In
order to analyze the implications of an SDRM, we focus on two main cases: one where all
bonds include CACs and there is no issue about jurisdictions (due to the presence of an
SDRM) and one where no bond includes CACs. In the first case, we assume that there is
complete coordination among bondholders, and hence, they act as one big lender. In the
second case, we assume the opposite is true and free riding makes renegotiation
impossible.
9
For future reference, we define the allocations as outcomes of the renegotiation process
when all bonds have CACs (Dl
NC=0) and the number of jurisdictions does not affect the







1 þ v ðÞ
1=v ð18Þ
as long as Dl *bDl. Note that incentives are driven by v, a parameter that determines the
sensitivity of the government to exert fiscal effort in troubled times. Also, Dl * decreases
with this parameter, and it goes to zero when vY0 (incentives to renegotiate can be
powerful).
Overall, our analysis suggests that allocations under CACs must be different than those
coming from solving Problem I due to the renegotiation. For this reason, we now turn to
study those allocations.
9 De Brun and Della Mea (2003) show that the free rider problem in renegotiations without CACs is
overestimated, as shown by the recent case of Uruguay 2003. In this case, renegotiation was implemented in a
short period of time despite the fact that the swapped debt did not include CACs. Nonetheless, the results of this
paper remain relevant as long as CACs can facilitate the renegotiation process.
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In the presence of CACs and an SDRM, contracts must be renegotiation proof,




Problem I; subject to DlVDl 4
where Dl * is given by Eq. (17).
Proposition 1. Under state contingent debt payments, debt contracts without CACs
dominate those with CACs.
Note that the lack of commitment to avoid renegotiation adds a constraint to our
problem with state contingent debt. Again, under CACs, it is not credible to set DlNDl *
since it is known that, in case of financial distress, the debt will be renegotiated.
2.5. Uncontingent debt payments and no CACs
In this case, creditors’ rights are assumed to be the same in all states, although default is
possible. Furthermore, governments pay what is owed as long as they have enough





Problem I; subject to min Dh;Yl fg ¼ Dl
where the constraint imposes that debt cannot be state contingent. This gives the following
result:
Proposition 2. Under no CACs, state contingent debt contracts dominate uncontingent
ones.
The argument here is similar to the one of Proposition 1. Optimal allocations in
Problem I derive at least the utility derived by allocations in Problem III.
2.6. Uncontingent debt payments, CACs, and an SDRM
Again, payments are uncontingent in this case, subject to the feasibility constraint.




Problem I; subject to min Dh;Dl 4
  
¼ Dl
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two statements result:
Proposition 3. Under CACs, state contingent debt contracts dominate uncontingent
ones. Now, the feasible set of Problem IV is included in the feasible set of Problem II.
Proposition 4. With uncontingent debt payments, there exist economies where debt
contracts with no CACs dominate those with such clauses and vice versa.
Because the intuition behind the proof is important for our discussion, we develop the
proof to this proposition here.
We prove our proposition by example. For this, we make some simplifying
assumptions. The first is






When the productive government expenditure is large enough, the country reaches a
higher probability of success (h ¯Nh). Notice that the distance |h ¯Nh| suggests a higher
sensitivity of final outcomes to the government expenditure G1, and it makes incentive
issues more relevant in our discussion. Another assumption is that YlbD. Hence, as we
noted from the lender’s participation constraint, DhNYl.
Now, assume that the debt contract does not include CACs. Because there is no
renegotiation in this case, the equilibrium level offiscal effort exerted by the country in case
of financial distress is simply e*=0, given that DhNYl. Governments will have no incentives
to exert fiscal effort because everything produced would be used to meet debt payments.
Then, from the lender’s participation constraint, we see that Dh satisfies h
¯
Dh=D.
Under our assumption about h(G1), the incentive constraint to support a high level of
productive government expenditure is
 
h ¯   h P
 
Yh   Dh ðÞ zkG
P
1 ð20Þ
Hence, the expected payoff for a country issuing debt without CACs is




Under CACs, countries and bondholders will renegotiate if the country reaches the state
of financial distress. Then, debt payments are given by Dl *. The problem with CACs is
otherwise equal to the previous one. But it is useful to inspect the incentive compatibility
constraint for this case.
Because renegotiation ispossible, thestate of the world where the countryfaces financial
distress is not that bad and hence distorts the country’s incentives to allocate the funds in
productive expenditure. The incentive compatibility constraint for a high level of G1 is
 
h ¯   h P
 
Yh   Dh  
vYl
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 (1+2v)/v is big enough to overturn Condition (20).
Consequently, the incentive compatibility constraint for h ¯ does not hold, and h=h.
Furthermore, G1=0. Since Dl=Dl *, the investors’ participation constraint becomes
h PDh þ 1   h P
   Yl   Dl 4






country’s expected payoff under CACs
EUC ¼ h PYh   D   1   h P
   v 2 þ v ðÞ
1 þ v ðÞ
1þ2v
v
Yl þ kD ð24Þ
Now, see that contracts without CACs dominate those with them whenever EUNEU
C,o r
equivalently
1   h P
   v 2 þ v ðÞ
1 þ v ðÞ
1þ2v
v
Ylb h ¯   h P
  
Yh   kG 1
P
ð25Þ
Intuitively, the result depends on the sensitivity of the probability h to productive
government expenditure. If this probability is unaffected by G1, then the optimal contract
should include CACs, and renegotiation takes place. Note that when |h ¯ h|Y0, our
condition will not hold, making debt contracts with CACs optimal. Why? Reducing the
cost of the contract ex post (making renegotiation easy to implement) is optimal ex ante.
Matters are different when this sensitivity is strong. By making the state of distress
harmful for governments, although ex post inefficient, it provides greater incentives for
them to stay out of trouble (by inducing fiscal responsibility). This is the case when, other
things equal, |h ¯ h| is big enough.
10 This concludes our proof.
Fig. 2 summarizes our results regarding the welfare implications of the different
contractual arrangements (where N implies dominance).
11
Fig. 2. Welfare under different debt contracts.
10 We work under the assumption that h
¯
N0. Otherwise, loans D could not be supported in equilibrium.
11 If we allow D to be a choice variable, although the levels of D are not the same under different contractual
environments, the results summarized in Fig. 2 would still hold.
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improve welfare in a world without state contingent contracts. This implies that
maybe more attention should be focused on how to complete markets on this regard
rather than on the SDRM (although the usual caveats apply). Indeed, GDP-growth-
indexed bonds have been proposed before. Second, our result implies that, in an
environment without the IMF, countries should be allowed to choose the type of
debt contract that best fits their needs. In this sense, an SDRM together with CACs
would be harmful when incentives are important. Furthermore, note that, in a world
with state contingent bonds, CACs would not be utilized since they would reduce
welfare.
Our next step is to study the role played by the IMF in affecting the government’s
expenditure decisions. Understanding the IMF’s role in international financial markets
turns out to be essential for our discussion because it distorts the international allocation of
capital.
3. A world with the IMF
In this paper, we model the IMF as a fund rather than an enforcer or an auditor. Unlike
in Miller and Zhang (2000), the fund is also a strategic player that maximizes its own
payoffs.
We think of the IMF as an institution responsible for representing a club of
countries when deciding on a bailout in response to an international financial crisis.
When a country defaults on its debt, it generates negative externalities to other
countries in the world in one way or another. Financial contagion is one example.
Other motives for intervention include geopolitical or economic reasons such as trade
Fig. 3. The game with the IMF.
F. Weinschelbaum, J. Wynne / Journal of International Economics 67 (2005) 47–72 59considerations. We model these reasons as a cost J that the international community
incurs when an emerging country arrives at the state of default (the no-output-state in
our story).
The IMF has the power to grant subsidized loans to countries in financial distress. In
our model, the size of the subsidy or bailout is S, and the purpose is to reduce the debt
overhang and introduce incentives for countries to avoid a state of default and financial
contagion. We describe the sequence of the model with the help of Fig. 3.
When the first uncertainty is resolved with a bad shock, the IMF has the possibility
of bailing out part or all of the outstanding debt. A bailout will affect the country’s
payoffs and hence its incentives to exert fiscal effort. In our simple story, we model the
bailout as a gift from the IMF to the country and international investors. While IMF
loans are subsidized, these loans are rarely defaulted on. Nonetheless, this assumption
captures two important ideas: (1) IMF interventions are subsidies to the recipient
country, and (2) IMF refinancing removes the problem from the current government,
which we assume only cares about the near future. For both reasons, we model the IMF
bailouts as gifts.
12
For practical purposes, we study the role of the IMF in the environment where
international debt obligations are not state contingent.
13 Nonetheless, debt payments might
be subject to renegotiation or default. We first study the case where debt contracts do not
include CACs.
3.1. Uncontingent debt payments and no CACs
The game is solved by backward induction. Once the first shock is realized as bad,
the IMF decides the size of the bailout, anticipating that there will be no renegotiation
(CACs are absent). The IMF’s bailout affects incentives and the probability of default
and financial contagion. Thus, the IMF solves the following problem:
max
S4;eIMF4




Yl þ S4   Dl ¼ e4
v
IMFYl ð27Þ
Dl ¼ min Dh;Yl þ S4 fg ð28Þ
0VS4VDh ð29Þ
whereEq.(27) is the government’s incentive compatibility. Condition (28) states that the
debt is uncontingent. Note that the total amount of resources available in the second
state is now Yl+S*. Condition (29) implies that the size of bailouts launched by the
12 That the IMF could recover part of the bailout is equivalent to an increase in J (which favors more frequent
IMF interventions).
13 We also rule out the possibility that the IMF could reward countries that reach the high output state.
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IMF’s problem exists, this is
Sint ¼  Yl þ Dh þ
J
v
   v
1=Yl





   1= v 1 ðÞ
ð31Þ
When S
intb0, the optimal solution for the IMF bailout is S*=0, which implies a fiscal
effort of e*=((Yl Dl)/(Yl))
1/v. Thus, when the debt overhang is low, or the negative
externality of default on the international community is low, the IMF’s best response is to
stay out. Equivalently, when S
intNDh, the IMF will implement a full bailout and drive the
effort to e*=1.
The second order conditions show that when vb1, or the elasticity of fiscal effort
to bailouts is greater than one, there is always a corner solution with full or no
bailout depending on the size of J. The necessary and sufficient condition for a full
bailout is
UIMF S ¼ Dl ðÞ ¼   DN   1  
Yl   min Yl;Dh fg
Yl
   1=v "#
J ¼ UIMF S ¼ 0 ðÞ
Note that when there is full bailout, Dl=Dh, and because e=1, Dh=D. Thus, when a full
bailout is anticipated, bonds will exhibit no risk premium (under no CACs). When there is
no bailout, the fiscal effort exerted is less than one and hence DhND. In this way, the full
bailout condition becomes
1  
Yl   Dh
Yl
   1=v "#
J N D for YlzDh; ð32Þ
or
J N D otherwise: ð33Þ
A full bailout arises if its cost (D) is smaller than the expected benefits ((1 e)J), or in
other words, if the IMF cares enough about the destiny of the country (J is big enough).
In short, independently of the parameter v being greater or less than one, we get that the
IMF’s best responses (possible bailout solutions) are
S4a 0;   Yl þ Dl þ
J
v
   v
1=Yl




depending on the case described by the above conditions.
Having solved for the IMF response, we can continue solving the country’s government
problem.
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max
Dh;Dl;G1
EU ¼ h G1 ðÞ Yh   Dh ½  þ 1   h G1 ðÞ ½ 
v Yl þ S4   Dl ðÞ
1þv
v
1 þ v ðÞ Y
1=v
l
  kG1 ð35Þ
subject to
h G1 ðÞ Dh þ 1   h G1 ðÞ ½  S4 þ
Yl þ S4   Dl ðÞ






hV G1 ðÞ Yh   Dh  
v Yl þ S4   Dl ðÞ
1þv
v





Dl ¼ min Dh;Yl þ S4 fg ð38Þ
and given that the bailout is optimally chosen by the IMF (see Eq. (34)). Thus, in case of
financial distress, lenders receive at least S* regardless of the outcome at this stage. When
the bailout is not full, lenders will get an additional Dl S* when the government manages
to pull the country out of default and meet debt payments. This event happens with
conditional probability e=((Yl+S Dl)/(Yl))
1/v. Several observations follow from this
problem.
First, note that the incentive compatibility constraint for G1 implies that, for the
same debt contract {D, Dh, Dh}, the productive government expenditure falls with
the size of the bailout. In that sense, episodes of financial distress are more frequent
if the IMF intervenes. Also, notice that Problem V nests Problem III when there is no
intervention (S*=0). This occurs when the size of the externalities on the international




We obtain that whenever the IMF intervenes (S*N0), then Dl=Dh, even if bailouts
are partial. This is because the IMF objective is to induce the government to exert
effort, and this would not happen when DlbDh (since the country would get zero
payoff in the intermediate state). Moreover, bailouts never exceed the promised Dh
since at S*=Dh, the fiscal effort is at its maximum (e=1, given our choice of the effort
function). We conclude that if the IMF intervenes (S*N0), the size of the bailout will
be Dh YlVS*VDh.
Now, we turn to the case where bonds include CACs and there is an SDRM to
coordinate creditors. We model the IMF and the lenders in a game where they
choose the amount of debt the IMF bails out and that lenders forgive. In particular,
we analyze a sequential game where the IMF is the leader in the debt restructuring
process.
14 We consider the sequential (versus the simultaneous) game more realistic, given
that the IMF is wired to deal with countries in financial distress and hence has a first mover
advantage.
14
In an Appendix available upon request, we analyze a simultaneous game. Multiplicity of equilibria in pure and
mixed strategies might arise in this case.
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Again, we solve the problem by backward induction and start analyzing the behavior of
the lender for a given size of the IMF’s bailout, under CACs and an SDRM.
The lenders’ forgiveness comes from their utility maximization problem. Lenders get
the IMF bailout S
+ when the country reaches the zero output state, which happens with
probability (1 e
+), and Dl
+ when the country reaches the intermediate output level state,
occurring with probability e
+. Superscript+stands for the optimal in the sequential
game. Note that while the debt is uncontingent, actual payments are subject to
renegotiation, and hence Dl




l ;eþ Vþ ¼ eþDþ
l þ 1   eþ ðÞ Sþ ð39Þ
subject to
Yl þ Sþ   Dþ










Yl þ Sþ ¼ Dl 4 þ Sþ ð42Þ
eþ ¼
1
1 þ v ðÞ
1=v ¼ e4 ð43Þ
where lenders renegotiate under an SDRM (no free riding). First, note that the level of
effort is independent of S
+, the IMF bailout. In fact, this is the same level of effort that
the borrower would exert under no bailout (see Eq. (18)). Also note that Dl
+ increases
one-for-one with S
+, so the lenders’ debt forgiveness plus the IMF’s bailout is a
constant. Hence, the remaining debt is the same as under no IMF intervention
(Dl
+ S
+=Dl *=((v)/(1+v))Yl). Strictly speaking, the lenders’ best response to an IMF






Yl þ Sþ when
v
1 þ v












When lenders forgive some of their capital, the IMF best response is to avoid wasting
resources in a bailout. In this case, a bailout does not change the fiscal effort exerted by the
government and hence the likelihood of avoiding the international financial contagion.






1/v, which implies that the bailout S
+ is bigger than
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+ Dl * without IMF intervention. Given the lenders’ best
response(Eq. (44)), the IMF bailout has to be strictly greater than Dh
+ ((v)/(1+v))Yl. This
result proves the following propositions:
15
Proposition 5. Under uncontingent debt contracts with CACs and an SDRM, the debt
forgiveness comes either from the IMF or from lenders but never from both of them.
The minimum amount of forgiveness is given by that coming from lenders
(max{Dh
+ ((v)/(1+v))Yl, 0}, as under Problem II). The IMF will only intervene with a
bailout larger than the potential forgiveness of lenders. Note that if the bailout is small,
lenders would forgive less (crowding out), and the fiscal effort would remain constant. In
other words, the IMF intervention would be sterilized by a smaller private debt for-
giveness. For this reason, if the IMF’s targeted fiscal effort is only slightly higher than e
+
in Eq. (43), the IMF would prefer to stay out rather than induce a higher fiscal effort.





Qualitatively, IMF intervention will occur when J is large enough and the difference
between the fiscal effort targeted by the IMF, and that of the lenders under no intervention
(e*), is large relative to the size of the bailout. Both partial (if vN1) and full bailouts can be
observed as equilibrium outcomes.
In summary, forgiveness comes either entirely from the IMF or from the lenders but
never from both, as stated by Proposition 5. Then, if bailouts (partial or full) are
equilibrium IMF responses in the sequential game, allocations will necessarily coincide
with those of Problem V (uncontingent debt payments, no collective action provisions, and
IMF). Also, if the IMF response is no bailout, allocations would coincide with those of
Problem IV (uncontingent debt payments, collective actions clauses, and an SDRM
without IMF).
Now, we show that, once a country is financially distressed, the IMF intervention is
more likely to occur under debt contracts without CACs.
Proposition 6. Contingent on being in a financial crisis, the parameter set for which there
is IMF intervention is larger under no CACs.
This proposition follows from the following argument. Assume we are under financial
crisis. We know from Proposition 5 that when there are CACs, there is never forgiveness
from both the IMF and the lenders. This implies that when there are CACs and the
equilibrium is such that the IMF intervenes anyway, the IMF would be indifferent between
having an SDRM in place or not. However, when there is no IMF intervention (S=0), the
IMF’s payoff is higher under CACs and an SDRM, since there is some forgiveness by the
lenders, and hence, the fiscal effort exerted by the government (e) is higher. Therefore,
whenever there is intervention under CACs and an SDRM, there is also intervention under
16 This is
  Sþ þ J











15 See that, in this case, the overall level of forgiveness to the government is greater, since Dl
+ S
+ b Dl *.
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favor of CACs and an SDRM.
3.3. Implications of IMF intervention
A complete characterization of the mapping from parameters to results is beyond the
scopeofthis papersince many cases ariseinaworldwiththeIMF.Instead,wenowfocus on
issues suggested by the theory that bring interesting economic insights to our discussion.
First note that if e*b1, and J is large enough, the IMF would always launch a full
bailout (since it will never allow a positive probability of default). Accepting that there are
economies where full bailout is an equilibrium outcome, we state
Proposition 7. The government’s welfare under full bailout is greater than under partial
and no bailout, independently of the inclusion of CACs.
For Proof, see Appendix.
The heart of the proof of this proposition relies on the fact that the incentive
compatibility constraint for G1 is not binding when there is a full bailout (S*=Dl=Dh=D).
The intuition is that moral hazard is a problem for the government because lenders charge
them a higher premium. But premiums disappear under a full bailout because of the
implicit IMF guarantee (since lenders always get paid).
But Proposition 7 cannot be generalized. The government’s welfare is not necessarily
increasing in the size of bailouts.
Proposition 8. The government’s welfare under partial bailout might be greater or smaller
than under no bailout, independently of the inclusion of CACs.
For proof, see Appendix.
The intuition of this proposition is similar to that of Proposition 4. Knowing that the
IMF would intervene, countries would implement lower levels of productive government
expenditure. If the productive government expenditure is sensitive to bailouts, the ex ante
moral hazard problem would be aggravated by the IMF presence. In this world, and
despite the implicit subsidy of the IMF intervention, countries could be better off if the
IMF did not exist.
The theory also suggests that sometimes, there is conflict between governments and the
IMF. When both the IMF and lenders’ targeted fiscal effort levels are about the same,
governments will definitely choose not to include CACs. In this case, the IMF prefers that
lenders forgive, but the country prefers an IMF bailout to receive the subsidy. This
argument makes debt without CACs an attractive proposition for governments, and an
SDRM a desirable institution for the IMF.
Of course, conflict between the IMF and the issuing government about the inclusion of
CACs does not always arise. Both might prefer debt contracts without CACs for moral
hazard considerations. On the other hand, both will prefer including these clauses in
environments where J is small enough and the moral hazard problem is negligible. Also,
conflict does not arise when the IMF wishes to implement a full bailout regardless of the
inclusion of CACs in debt contracts (J is big enough).
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as a commitment device to induce fiscal responsibility, opposite to common wisdom.
This might happen in environments where the targeted fiscal effort of the IMF is higher
than that of lenders. In this case, if the government decides to include CACs in debt
contracts and the IMF chooses not to implement a bailout, lenders would renegotiate.
Then, the fiscal effort exerted by the government is that targeted by the lenders (which is
lower). On the contrary, if the government opted for no friendly orderly restructuring
provisions, the IMF would implement a bailout. When moral hazard problems are severe
in that parameter range, the IMF intervention might end up reducing the government’s
welfare.
17 In this environment, an SDRM that facilitates renegotiation would be welfare
enhancing for both the IMF and the government, precisely for moral hazard
considerations.
4. Lessons from yields
Our paper has a series of empirical implications. Eichengreen and Mody (2000) conduct
an empirical investigation to answer the question whether CACs raise borrowing costs.
Looking at primary debt markets (issuance), they find that, during the 1990s, East Asian
issuers paid lower spreads under UK law—which forces all debt contracts to include
CACs—while Latin American and Eastern European spreads were lower under US law—
which does not enforce friendly orderly restructuring provisions. These findings are
confirmed by Eichengreen et al. (2003) who work with data on secondary debt markets.
Fromtheirfindings,theyconjecturethat,forblesscredit-worthyborrowers,theadvantageof
provisions facilitating an orderly restructuring is offset by the moral hazard and additional
default risk associated with the presence of renegotiation-friendly loan provisions.Q Becker
et al. (2003) and Gugiatti and Richards (2003) argue that bond prices are not affected much
by the implicit or explicit inclusion of these types of clauses when we look at yields in
secondary markets. Hence, they say, either financial markets are not really aware of the role
of those clauses, which seems to be supported by their conversations with practitioners, or
the moral hazard problem that these clauses bring to international credit markets does not
outweigh the ex post inefficiencies (of no renegotiation).
We rationalize this discussion with the help of the lenders’ participation constraint,




  1 ¼











In the absence of IMF bailouts (S=0), the value of the debt under financial distress (eDl)
increases if CACs are present, reducing the yields (Part 2 decreases). Renegotiation allows
the parties to appropriate the ex post gains from trade. If moral hazard is mild, then h will
17 Eichengreen and Ruhl (2000) also point out that CACs can make it incentive-compatible for the IMF not to
intervene.
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hazard is important, then yields will be higher under CACs (since Part 1 increases). As long
as v is sensitive to G1, CACs are a bad idea (since they introduce too much moral hazard).
Led by this argument, the empirical literature mentioned above argues that because the
spread between yields in bonds with and without CACs is small, these two forces must be
balanced. Hence, they claim, an SDRM cannot be harmful.
18
Our model shows that these conclusions are incorrect when (a) the IMF is inclined to
intervene, and (b) there are compositional effects in sovereign debt markets. The former
occurs when the destiny of the country is important for the international community, or J is
large. Anticipating the bailout, countries would issue debt without CACs or disseminated in
various jurisdictions (compositional effect). The IMF would then launch a bailout if a crisis
Fig. 5. Argentine yields comparison in 2001 crisis.
Fig. 4. Debt composition, Argentina 2002.
18 Other contributions support this idea. See arguments presented in Haldane et al. (2003) and Dixon and Wall
(2000).
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zero yield (lenders always collect, either from the country or from the IMF). In this case,




might sufferfrom Lucas’ critique due to a compositional effectin sovereign debt markets. A
largefractionofsovereign debtisplacedinjurisdictionsthatdonotincludeCACs, whilethe
rest is divided among many jurisdictions. As shown by Condition (16), that incentives are
aligned within a jurisdiction does not imply that lenders would forgive. If so, CACs
become an irrelevant dimension of debt contracts since, under financial distress, no debt
would be forgiven (and yields would be the same).
19 Assuming that no yield differential
implies that the moral hazard problem is balanced by the gains from renegotiation is,
simply, a mistake. Furthermore, under a new regime with an SDRM, bond prices could be
substantially different due to the presence of moral hazard (Lucas’ critique).
The data we examined suggest that CACs were an irrelevant dimension of debt
contracts for the case of Argentina in 2001 (Fig. 4). If CACs are irrelevant because of the
compositional effect, bond yields should be the same not only ex ante but also once the
country has fallen into financial distress (before renegotiation and after or during a
financial crisis). If they are relevant, yields on bonds with CACs should increase more
during a crisis, since these bondholders will forgive while the rest will not.
Before proceeding, we point out that the compositional effect is heavily present in the
Argentine case. About 46% of the total debt is likely to be excluded from renegotiation.
For example, loans from multilateral agencies, which are nonrenegotiable, account for
19% of the total debt. The remaining 54% of the debt is distributed among eight
jurisdictions of which New York, Germany, and Japan (accounting for 70% of the
renegotiable debt) have no CACs.
Having said that, Fig. 5 shows the evolution of yields for two very similar Argentinean
bondsissuedunderUKlaw,withCACs,andGermanlaw,withoutthem,duringtheperiodof
financial distress.
20 Argentina fell into financial distress in the last quarter of 2001, when
fundamentals were weak and the US announced its position against IMF intervention.
Table 1
Comparison of crisis features
Issue Russia Ukraine Ecuador Pakistan Argentina
# of old bonds involved 3 5 5 3 152
Amount restructured(US$ MM) 31,600 2600 6600 610 82,000
# of legislation involved 1 3 2 1 8
Official debt/total debt (%) 45 75 50 88 23
Source, Marx (2003).
19 Note that this argument could explain why practitioners do not pay attention to CACs.
20 Both bonds are named bLetras Externas de la Republica ArgentinaQ and are denominated in Euros. Both pay
principal upon maturity (the one issued in Germany, in January 26 of 2007, while the one issued in UK, in
February 22 of 2007). Interests are paid annually (the German bond pays 10.25% and the UK one 10%). Source:
JPMorgan.
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opportunities are absent in bond markets, we argue that CACs were irrelevant clauses in
Argentine bonds probably because of the compositional effect. In other words, CACs had
no value along the equilibrium path.
Lastly, compositional effects were likely to be present in other experiences of default.
Table 1 presents data on debt composition for Russia, Ukraine, Ecuador, Pakistan, and
Argentina. The number of bonds issued by these sovereigns as well as the number of
jurisdictions involved is not as large as for the case of Argentina. Yet, official debt is
largely nonrenegotiable (in the case of Pakistan, for example, the official debt was 88%).
While evidence suggest that CACs are unlikely to be a relevant characteristic in debt
contracts for these experiences, future research should be done to assert whether this is
also the case for most emerging countries and, furthermore, whether the presence of the
IMF can also help explain the small value of these clauses in sovereign debt markets.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 7. We start by defining Problem V(-IC) as Problem V without the
incentive compatibility constraint for G1:
max
Dh;G1
EU ¼ h G1 ðÞ Yh   Dh ½  þ 1   h G1 ðÞ ½ 
v Yl þ S4   Dl ðÞ
1þv
v
1 þ v ðÞ Y
1=v
l
  kG1 ð45Þ
subject to
h G1 ðÞ Dh þ 1   h G1 ðÞ ½  S4 þ
Yl þ S4   Dl ðÞ







Dl ¼ min Yl þ S4;Dh fg
S4a 0;   Yl þ Dh þ
J
v
   v
1=Yl
   1= v 1 ðÞ
;Dh
()
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(1) The utility of the government under Problem V(-IC) is increasing in S*, since the
objective function is increasing in S* and the lender’s participation constraint relaxes
with S*.
(2) The utility of the government for a given value of S* under Problem V(-IC) is
greaterthan or equal to the one under Problem V, since Problem V has an addi
tional constraint (the incentive compatibility for G1).
(3) When S*=Dh, the solution of Problem V(-IC) satisfies the incentive compa
tibility constraint. Hence, the value of the utility of the government under Problem
V(-IC) equals the one under Problem V.
The proof follows from these three facts. 5
Proof of Proposition 8. We prove our proposition by example, as we did for
Proposition 4. Again we assume







21 Another assumption is that YlbD.
The incentive constraint to support a high level of productive government expenditure
under our assumption about h(G1) is then
h ¯   h P
  
Yh   Dh ðÞ zkG 1
P
: ð48Þ
The expected payoff for a country issuing debt without collective action clauses and
under no bailout is
EU ¼ h ¯Yh   D þ kD   G1
P   
: ð49Þ
Under partial bailout, if the country reaches the state of financial distress, the IMF will
provide funds in the amount of S*= Yl+Dh+((J/v)
v1/Yl)
1/(v 1). It is useful to inspect the
incentive compatibility constraint for this case. Because under partial bailout, the state of
the world where the country faces financial distress is not that bad, the government’s
incentives to allocate the funds in productive expenditure deteriorate. The incentive
compatibility constraint for a high level of G1 is
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21 We work under the assumption that hN0. Otherwise loans for the amount of D could not be supported in
equilibrium.








1þv ðÞis big enough to overturn Condition (48). Consequently, the
incentive compatibility constraint for h ¯ does not hold and h=h. Furthermore, G1=0. Since
Dl=Dh, the investors’ participation constraint becomes
h PDh þ 1   h P
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Plugging this constraint into the objective function, we obtain the country’s expected
utility when the IMF is present
EUðIMFÞ¼h PYh   h PDh   1   h P
   v Yl þ S4   Dh ðÞ
1þv
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Now, we are able to observe that contracts without CACs dominate those with them
whenever EUNEU(IMF). Equivalently
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As in Proposition 4, the result depends on the sensitivity of the probability h to
productive government expenditure. If this probability is unaffected by G1, then the
government is better with partial bailout. Note that when |h ¯ Nh|Y0, it is more unlikely that
our condition will hold. Why? Reducing the cost of the contract ex post is optimal ex ante.
F. Weinschelbaum, J. Wynne / Journal of International Economics 67 (2005) 47–72 71Matters are different when this sensitivity is strong. Making the state of distress very
bad (although ex post inefficient) will provide greater incentives for countries to stay out
of trouble and to maintain fiscal conduct. This is the case when, other things equal, |h ¯ h|
is bigger. 5
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